GOAL AND SOURCE VERBS. For the goal verbs in
The goal verbs labeled human roles in List 6 contrast with the agent verbs in an important way. In John fathered the child, with an agent verb, John is the father; but in John orphaned the child, with a goal verb, the child (not John) is the orphan. But what makes some roles agentive and others factitive? From the examples in List 6, the answer seems clear. For agent verbs, the parent nouns denote roles or professions that people take on deliberately. For goal verbs, however, the parent nouns denote roles conferred on people by external forces, sometimes against their will. It is because butchering is an active role that The school butchered John cannot be taken to mean 'The school turned John into a butcher.' Yet being a fool is a role that can be either active or receptive, as in Nick fooled around with Asta vs. Nick fooled Nora.
In List 7, piece the quilt together is classified as a source verb on the basis of the rather awkward paraphrase do something to cause it to come about that [the quilt is together out of pieces], i.e. put the quilt together from pieces. Here piece denotes the substance from which the quilt is formed, and is therefore in the source case. Word the sentence carefully and letter the sign may also be source verbs. A. Go: (intr.) auto, +sports-car, caravan, +trailer, +tractor, +cablecar, +tram, +trolley, +streetcar, scooter, motorcycle, bicycle, bike, cycle, +tricycle, +van, +cab, taxi, +jitney, + Greyhound, +Buick, +V-8, + limousine, + elevator, + escalator (somewhere); boat, + sailboat, +steamship, +Queen Mary, yacht, punt, +flatboat, +lighter, barge, raft, canoe, kayak (somewhere); jet, +'747, +Concorde, sailplane, +glider, helicopter, +chopper, +Zeppelin, balloon, parachute, +TWA, + UA, +Air California, rocket (somewhere); sleigh, sledge, sled, ski, +t-bar, skate, roller-skate, +pogo-stick, +skateboard, water-ski, surfboard, snowshoe (somewhere); pole, +barge-pole, paddle, +oar, scull, +ski-pole, +ice-pick, +pickax, pedal (somewhere); +rope, + crampon (one's way somewhere); sail, wing, steam, motor (somewhere); +subway to 64th Street, +BART to Berkeley, thumb to LA, surf onto shore, + whirlwind across the US, +guitar his way across the US, +The police sirened up to the accident [Herb Caen]; (tr.) +ambulance, truck, bus, +trailer, +wagon, cart, +pushcart, +barrow, +stretcher, wheelbarrow (something somewhere); ferry, wherry, ship (something somewhere); telegraph, telephone, wire, cable, + long-distance, +postcard, +semaphore, + flag, radio, beam (a message somewhere); +satellite (news); dial the number; paddle the canoe, pedal the bicycle; wheel the patient into surgery, sail the boat to LA, pipe the oil to Oregon, +tanker the oil to the US. B. Fasten: NAILS-nail, tack, staple, bolt, screw, paper-clip, pin, rivet, wire, solder (something to something else). GLuES-paste, cement, glue, gum, + epoxy, tape, scotch-tape, cellotape, +masking-tape (something to something else), +web his clothes to the wall [Spiderman].
RESTRAINERS-shackle, clamp, handcuff, gyve, fetter, manacle, chain, gag, belt, + seat-belt (someone); cord the wood. LOCKS-latch, padlock, bar, lock, +hasp (the door). CLOTHING PARTS-buckle his belt, clasp his belt, hook her dress, zip the dress, snap the shirt, button the shirt, strap on the skis, +thong the sandals on. LINES-tether, cable, anchor (something to something else).
C. Clean: IMPLEMENTS-mop the floor, +broom the floor, +floor-sweeper the carpet, Hoover the rug, snowplow the road, rake the grass, filter the wine, bath himself, shower, +floss one's teeth, +Stimudent one's teeth. CLOTHS-sponge the window clean, flannel one's face, chamois the window clean, sandpaper the board smooth, steel-wool the pan, towel himself dry, washcloth his face clean. CLEANSERS-shampoo his hair, +Ajavx the bath, +Vim the bath, + Windex the panes, + soap-and-water one's hands. D. Hit: hammer the nail into the board, club the man over the head, bat the ball, +shillelagh his cousin, + bottle the sailor, +poleax the intruder, boot the man in the pants, + shoe-heel the nail into the frame, stone the witch, +rock the men, press the tongue, +rawhide his companion, whip the prisoner, bullwhip the dog, cane the child, +ruler the child's hand. E. Cut, stab: knife the man, bayonet the enemy, +sabre the enemy, +tusk the dogs, +razor off his beard, +scissor through the material, drill the hole, saw the plank, lance the armor, + hatchet the tree down, ax the tree down, + broadax the log flat, hacksaw through the board, +ripsaw the board, spear the fish, scythe the grass, +bill-hook the grass, tomahawk the settlers, machete his way through the jungle, harpoon the whale, + toothpick the clam. F. Destroy: bomb the village, torpedo the ship, +avalanche the village, grenade the bunker, + napalm the village, shell the fort, gas the soldiers, dynamite the building, torch the house, + frag the sergeant, + TNT the building, fire-bomb the car, gun down the man, + sten down the enemy, + M-l the sniper, tear-gas the sniper, + Mace the strikers, +carbon monoxide oneself to death, garotte the prisoner. G. Catch: trap the gopher, bear-trap the man, net the fish, seine the fish, snare the rabbit, hook the fish, lime the bird, lasso the calf, rope the calf, collar the dog, +jaw the swimmer (following the film Jaws).
H Most instrument verbs can take a type of reduced complement. Consider bicycle. As 12 shows, 11 expresses (or contains) the complement John was in town, which describes the result that John brought about by his use of the bicycle: he caused himself to be in town by bicycling. But alongside 11, there is the ordinary John walked into town. It contains the same complement; but now the result is brought about by John's walking: he caused himself to be in town by walking. Sentences like these, then, divide notionally into a causative portion (John caused himself to be in town) and an instrumental portion (by John's bicycling/walking). Similarly, Julia hammered the nail into the board divides into Julia caused the nail to be in the board and by Julia's hammering the nail; and George toweled himself dry divides into George caused himself to be dry and by George's toweling himself: Note that, if Julia had willed, thrown, or shot the nail into the board (or if George had shaken, blown, or walked himself dry), only the instrumental portions of these sentences would have changed.
But what about the instrumental portions of John bicycled, or Julia hammered the nail, or George toweled himself? These are simple instrumental verbs, as can be illustrated for John bicycled. As 12 shows, this means simply 'John did the act one would normally expect [one to do with a bicycle].' In this paraphrase, the bicycle is an instrument for moving; the moving is not itself instrumental in accomplishing something else.
To make things difficult, however, locatum and location verbs often look very much like instrument verbs. Take Ned leashed the dog: is leash a locatum verb ('Ned caused the dog to have a leash on it'), or an instrument verb ('Ned caused the dog to be restrained by doing the act one would normally expect to do to a dog with a leash') ? Or take Bob netted the fish: is it a location verb (' Bob caused the fish to be in a net'), or an instrument verb ('Bob caused the fish to be captive by doing the act one would normally expect to do to the fish with a net')? Indeed, both sentences could be ambiguous, or both could be vague. Fortunately, there are several criteria that generally distinguish locatum and location verbs from instrument verbs.
The first criterion is that locatum and location verbs have resultant states in which the parent noun plays an intrinsic role-as the thing placed or the location at which it is placed-whereas instrument verbs do not. Compare plaster the wall (with a locatum verb) to trowel the plaster onto the wall (with an instrument verb). The resultant state for both is Plaster is on the wall. This contains plaster, the parent noun of the locatum verb, but not trowel, the parent noun of the instrument verb. In trowelling the plaster onto the wall, the trowel is necessary for accomplishing the final result, but is not itself part of that result. The contrast between bottle the beer (with a location verb) and siphon the beer into the bottle (with an instrument verb) works the same way. The resultant state, the beer is in a bottle, contains bottle but not siphon. This criterion, however, must be applied with care. Plaster the wall, one might argue, is really 'cause the wall to have a cover on it by plastering it', and so plaster is really an instrument verb. But in this paraphrase cover is really the superordinate of plaster, and merely conceals the fact that the plaster is an inherent part of the resultant state.
Watt 1973 provides further evidence for this criterion, at least for location verbs. He notes that do it can be used to refer to the 'fasten' part of the meaning of nail, as in 13 (Watt' And 14 is no better if in is replaced by with. Watt argues, therefore, that bottle the beer does not mean 'containerize the beer with/in bottles', but rather 'put the beer into bottles'. The bottles aren't instruments by which a result is accomplished, but an intrinsic part of the result itself-the beer's being in the bottles. So while instrument verbs are generally paraphrasable as 'do it with X', location verbs are generally paraphrasable as 'do it in/on/at X'. Watt's evidence adds credence to the first criterion, and to the idea that there is a genuine distinction between 'pure' cases of instrument and location verbs. Instrument verbs are also distinguishable from locatum and location verbs in the way they form antonyms. De-and dis-, Marchand observes (1969:134-5), can be used with locatum and location verbs. When added to locatum verbs, they result in 'privative verbs' like defrost and disarm; when added to location verbs, they result in 'ablative verbs' like deplane and disbar. In effect, they add a negative to the parent clause of the positive verbs frost, arm, and plane (bar cannot stand alone). But deand dis-cannot be added to instrument verbs. To make these verbs 'reversative', one must add un-, as in unglue and unshackle (although one can also add un-to location verbs, as in unsaddle); thus, debuttoning a shirt should be different from unbuttoning it, and it is. In debuttoning, one takes buttons off; but in unbuttoning, one unfastens them, reversing their usual instrumental effect.' So instrument verbs are distinguished on morphological grounds too.
Yet some instrument verbs appear to work BY VIRTUE OF their being locata or locations. Let us return to leash and net. As a locatum verb, leash (the dog) means 'put a leash on the dog'. But dictionaries also list what amounts to 'cause the dog to be restrained by putting a leash on the dog', as if leash the dog were actually leash the dog restrained with the restrained implicit. In this interpretation, leash is an instrument verb, but one that works by virtue of its first being a locatum verb. Leash the dog should therefore be ambiguous, and it is. Unleash means to reverse the constraints, based on the instrument reading; deleash means to take the leash off, based on the locatum reading, although both are accomplished by the same action. Note that leash the dog to the post forces the instrument reading-so, while one can UNLEASH the dog from the post, one cannot DELEASH it from the post. Similarly, net the fish seems ambiguous. It can be a location verb, 'cause the fish to be in a net', or an instrument verb, 'cause the fish to be captive by causing it to be in a net', which works by virtue of its first being a location verb. . But these crop verbs differ from the earlier locatum verbs in that the location does not have to be mentioned, e.g. Roger hays for a living; the emphasis is more on collecting hay than on ridding the field of it. It is as if these verbs, like leash and net, are instrumental, in that collecting the hay is achieved in part by taking it from the field. In any case, their meanings are more complex than those of locatum verbs with negative prepositions like pit and core. The third type is another variety of object verb, but one in which the verb denotes an action that happens to the entity denoted by the parent noun that itself is PART of the entity denoted by the surface object:
(19) The car rear-ended the van.
(20) The car did to the rear-end that belonged to the van the action one would normally expect [a car to do to a rear-end]. With lip and rim, the ball and shot careened off these parts; with rear-end, the car crashed into that part; and with wing and kneecap, the agent injured these parts. But clearly these paraphrases do not do justice to the surplus meanings in each expression.
Finally, there are a few element verbs, which are still another kind of object verb, since they denote the activities characteristic of rain, snow, hail, and sleet. It is raining might be paraphrased 'It (the weather) is doing the activity that one would normally expect [ But is this the right approach? For many common denominal verbs, derivations lead to problems. First, the noun origins of many verbs have been completely lost. How many people go back to Captain Boycott, Judge Lynch, and writing slates on hearing boycott the store, lynch the prisoner, and slate the event? These verbs have become opaque idioms. Second, even the more transparent verbs have interpretations that, strictly speaking, don't contain the parent noun. If land and park truly meant 'put onto land' and 'put into a park', how could one land on a lake and park in a garage? Third, denominal verbs usually have semantic idiosyncrasies. Why should land the plane mean 'put down' and ground the plane 'keep down', instead of the reverse? That is, most common denominal verbs seem to be full or partial idioms. Their meanings have become fully or partially specialized, and are not fully predictable by an across-the-board process of derivation (see also Bolinger 1975 , Chomsky 1970 , Downing 1977 .
Innovative denominal verbs, however, do not have these problems. By definition they are not idioms; therefore they must be accounted for by some productive mechanism. But what is the mechanism like ? We will be in a position to offer an answer to this question once we have considered the special properties of innovative verbs.
CONTEXTUAL EXPRESSIONS. Most semantic theories distinguish what we will
call purely denotational expressions (man, blue, walk, day, bachelor) from indexical or deictic expressions (he, over there, yesterday, the bachelor). For an expression to be purely denotational, it must have a fixed sense and denotation. Bachelor, for example, has a fixed sense, say 'unmarried man', and denotes unmarried men in every real or imaginary world. Most English nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs are of this type. For an expression to be indexical, however, it must have a fixed sense and denotation, but a shifting reference (Bar-Hillel 1954). He, for example, has a fixed sense, say 'male person', and denotes male people in every real or imaginary world. But the particular person it refers to-its referent-changes with the time, place, and circumstances of its utterance.4 The referential shifting is critical. Note that while bachelor is purely denotational, the bachelor is indexical because its referent will change from one use to another. What about innovative verbs? We will argue that they are neither purely denotational nor indexical, for they have a SHIFTING sense and denotation. They constitute a new category that we will call CONTEXTUALS.
To identify contextuals, one must be able to distinguish shifting from fixed sense and denotation. For that, we suggest three interrelated criteria. much greater obligation on the speaker and listener than does fixed sense and denotation. To use bachelor, the speaker must merely make certain that its denotation is correct-that the class of things it is intended to denote consists, say, of unmarried men. To use he, however, the speaker must also rely on the close cooperation of the listener, who must normally take note of such things as the speaker's gestures, the people he has just mentioned, esoteric or private allusions, and other momentarily relevant facts about the conversation. That is, shifting reference requires a moment-to-moment cooperation that fixed sense and denotation do not. If contextuals with their shifting sense and denotation make similar demands, then we should expect moment-to-moment cooperation to be essential to their interpretation too.
Using these criteria, we will argue that innovative denominal verbs are contextuals. They have an indefinitely large number of potential senses; and their interpretation depends on the context, especially the cooperation of the speaker and listener. Once this is granted, innovative verbs must be dealt with differently from both purely denotational and indexical expressions. If Houdini is a contextual, it should have an indefinitely large number of potential senses; and it does. Indeed, it has as many senses as there are facts that speakers and listeners could mutually know about Houdini. In theory, that number is indefinitely large. In context, of course, the number is narrowed down to one; it must be, just as the indefinitely large number of possible referents for he is narrowed down to one. That is accomplished through the speaker's and listener's judicious use of contextual facts. We will consider how that is done later.
Against this analysis, however, one could argue that the verb Houdini is derived from a Houdini, a common noun, rather than Houdini, the proper noun. Since a Houdini can be purely denotational, as in He is a Houdini (the argument would go), the verb Houdini could be derived with a fixed sense and denotation. Even under the common-noun proposal, however, the verb Houdini must be a contextual. Note that a Houdini is itself an innovation, whose sense and denotation on each occasion depends on the speaker's and listener's mutual knowledge about Houdini and the context. So if the verb Houdini is formed from a Houdini, it too must be a contextual. At present, we know of no evidence favoring either Houdini's direct formation from the proper noun or its indirect formation via the common noun. We will assume the direct route, although nothing critical to our argument hangs on that assumption.
COMMON NOUNS.
Unlike proper nouns, most common nouns have a sense that could conceivably serve as the basis for the sense of innovative verbs. To loaf the dough, for example, might be derived from something like to cause the dough to come to be like a loaf. The sense of the lexical constants cause, come, be, and like would be conflated with the sense of loaf, to form the sense of to loaf. This is the essence of Green's and McCawley's approaches.
The trick is to find the right lexical constants. Thus Green (221) argues that instrument verbs (like hammer and radio) are derived from 'as by using NP (on) in the usual manner, for the purpose for which it was designed'. Given the hammer's design and usual manner of use, hammer gets roughly the right interpretation in hammer the nail into the board and hammer on his head with a shoe. The representation also accounts for such innovations as unicycle down the street, autoclave the scalpels, and keypunch the data.
Counter-examples, however, are easy to find. On the BBC in 1976, a demonstrator complained, We were stoned and bottled by the spectators as we marched down the street; and the (London) Observer noted that battered wives may be stabbed or bottled as well as punched. Bottles, of course, are designed for storing liquid, as reflected in bottle the beer; yet both innovations are perfectly interpretable. Most objects can be used for purposes for which they weren't designed, and So teapot, like Houdini, is a contextual, with a shifting sense and denotation. First, teapot has an indefinitely large number of possible senses. It has as many senses as there are Max-like stories that one could contrive, and that number is without limit. Second, its sense and denotation on each occasion depend on the context. If teapot the policeman had been uttered under different circumstances, it could have had the sense 'bash a teapot over the head of', 'offer a teapot to', 'turn by sorcery into the shape of a teapot', etc. Note, incidentally, that in each of these senses, the verb teapot 'relies' in part on the fixed sense of the noun teapot in denoting teapots. It is just that, of the many situations in which teapots can play a role, the one intended can only be determined at the time of utterance. Third, the sense of teapot intended on each occasion depends critically on the cooperation of the speaker and listener. They must assess their mutual knowledge at the moment, and use other constraints that we will take up later. What holds for teapot appears to hold for every other innovative denominal verb, as well. Thus innovative verbs formed from common nouns appear to be contextuals too. Although Green's representation for instrument verbs makes them appear to have a fixed sense and denotation, that isn't really so. Note that her representation contains the phrases 'the usual manner' and 'the purpose for which it was designed' -both indexical expressions whose referents change with the time, place, and circumstances of the utterance. Both phrases refer to facts that presumably lie outside one's linguistic knowledge. Since these indexicals depend on context, so must the senses that contain them; and the same obviously holds for many of our initial paraphrases. The one for butcher 'do the act that one would normally expect a butcher to do' hides an assortment of similar indexicals, as does the one for bicycle. Treating innovative verbs as contextuals makes quite explicit what up to now has always been implicit in such paraphrases. This convention, in effect, has two parts. Conditions 23a-e, or something like them, appear to apply to all contextuals. The condition specific to denominal verbs is 23f, which refers to the syntactic structure of denominal verbs as opposed to compound nouns, shorthand expressions, or other contextual expressions. The importance of these conditions will become clear as we proceed.
To see how this convention applies, imagine a news agent one day insisting to us that The boy porched the newspaper. By the convention, the news agent had in mind a kind of situation he felt we would be able to identify uniquely from our mutual knowledge of porches, their relation to newspapers, paper boys, and the topic of conversation-the boy's delivery of the newspaper. To be so confident, he must have judged that this kind of situation would be salient-conspicuously unique, given our mutual knowledge or beliefs. What could be so salient? A distinguishing characteristic of porches is that they are shelters adjacent to the main door into a house. They are associated with a state that can, for convenience, be expressed as the propositional function On(x, a porch)-' x is on a porch', where x is ordinarily something susceptible of being sheltered. The direct object of porched, namely the newspaper, refers to an entity that fits x's specifications, so we have On(the newspaper, a porch). To use up the surface subject the boy, we can best view this state as the consequence of the boy's action, adding the inchoative Comeabout(x), the causative Cause(x, y), and the act Do(x, y) to give 24 and its paraphrase 25:
(24) Cause(Do(the boy, something), Come-about(On(the newspaper, a porch))) (25) The boy did something to cause it to come about that [the newspaper was on a porch]. As part of this reasoning, we also realize that the news agent's topic of conversation was newspaper deliveries; and that he mentioned the paper boy, the newspaper, and a porch. On these grounds alone, we could infer that he very likely intended porch to denote the act of the boy's delivering the newspaper onto the porch. That agrees with 24 to give us more confidence in our inductive inference. This, however, isn't enough. ). We will begin by outlining a suitably-framed theory suggested by this work. The aim, we emphasize, is not to establish a theory of realworld knowledge, but to outline an empirical enterprise that we claim must be worked out before one can have an adequate explanation of innovative denominal verbs.
3.2. WORLD KNOWLEDGE can be divided roughly into two parts. GENERIC KNOWLEDGE is what people tacitly know about space and time, the basic physical laws, natural kinds, manufactured artifacts and their functions, and so on. People normally assume that generic knowledge doesn't vary much from person to person; they believe that a large core of it is shared by friend and stranger alike. PARTICULAR KNOWLEDGE, however, is what people tacitly know about particular or individual entities-particular objects, events, states, and processes.6 Particular knowledge 6 We mean particular and individual in the sense of Strawson's individuals (1959). The distinction between generic and particular knowledge here is similar but not identical to the distinction widely used in psychology between the badly misnamed 'semantic' memory and episodic memory. As defined by Tulving (1972:385-6), episodic memory consists of 'temporally dated episodes or events, and temporal-spatial relations among these events', which 'are stored in terms of [their] autobiographical reference to the already existing contents of the episodic memory store'. By exclusion, semantic memory consists of all other types of knowledge. Philosophically, it is more defensible to divide knowledge into particulars and non-particulars. Anyway, Tulving's episodes-particular events-cannot be given 'autobiographical reference' depends critically on a person's history. The particulars that one person knowshis parents, his experiences yesterday, and the person to whom he has just talkedwon't necessarily be particulars that the next person knows. The commonest denominal verbs, both idiomatic and innovative, depend mainly on generic knowledge about concrete objects; and so it is important to understand what this knowledge might be like.
Our first premise is that people have GENERIC THEORIES about concrete objects, theories they use for categorizing objects. These theories specify three basic aspects of an object: its physical characteristics, its ontogeny, and its potential roles. The theory for ordinary bricks, for example, specifies (a) the normal range of their physical characteristics, e.g. their color, shape, weight, and breakability; (b) their normal ontogeny, e.g. that they are molded from clay, baked in ovens, and sold by building-supply firms; and (c) their potential roles, e.g. that they are ordinarily cemented with mortar in horizontal rows to form walls, are sometimes used as doorstops, and can be used as riot missiles. These theories, we assume, have evolved to be conceptually optimal; in these three respects, the objects within a category are as similar as possible to each other, and as different as possible from objects in neighboring categories at the same level of abstraction. This assumption has empirical support in Rosch & Mervis 1975 (see also Tversky 1977) .
These theories are essential in order for people to deal effectively with the world around them. If something looks like a brick, people must be able to infer that it probably has certain other physical characteristics, the normal brick ontogeny, and the potential to play the normal brick roles. Without such a theory, each new brick would have to be treated as novel and without predictable properties. Animals must also have such theories, of course; the ability to categorize isn't an exclusively human prerogative.
Because of these theories, some objects are viewed as more central to (or typical of) a category than others. Red bricks, for example, are probably viewed as more typical of the category 'brick' than gold bricks, wooden bricks, glass bricks, bricks of cheese, or bricks of ice cream: red bricks fit people's theory for bricks best. As has been shown by Rosch & Mervis and by Hampton, the more properties an object shares with other objects in a category, the more typical of that category it is judged to be.
The properties within each theory, however, do not carry equal weight; some are more central to the characterization of the category than others. The most central of these we will call PREDOMINANT FEATURES. Thus predominant features of bricks seem to be their box shape and child's-shoebox size. The brick's other physical characteristics, ontogeny, and potential roles seem generally less central, although not equally so. The predominant feature of orphans, in contrast, is a fact about their ontogeny: they are people whose parents died before they were raised. The predominant feature of vehicles is the fact about their potential role that they are used for transportation.
to other contents of 'episodic memory' without referring to particular objects (the I of the autobiographer), particular states, and particular processes. Particular knowledge seems to fit Tulving's requirements for episodic memory better than his own definition does.
What exactly are predominant features? Our hypothesis is that they can be derived from notions of 'cue validity'. According to work by Rosch and her colleagues (1975, 1976 ) and Tversky 1977, the categories that people prefer for natural objects and human artifacts are those that maximize both the similarity between any two members of the same category and the dissimilarity between any two members of different categories. That is, the categories maximize 'cue validity': the more that cues or features are associated with the members of a category, and not with the members of other categories at the same level, the better that category is. As for any particular cue, the more it distinguishes the members of the category from the members of other categories, the more VALID it is said to be. Formally, cue validity can be defined very precisely.
Since there has been little discussion of the practical identification of predominant features, we will offer several tentative procedures. A predominant feature of a category is one that tends to hold for most of its members-especially its typical members-but not for members of neighboring categories. So a predominant feature of a widow is that she is a woman whose current social status is the result of her husband's being deceased. Being human, adult, or female are not by themselves predominant features of widows-since these do not distinguish widows from wives, spinsters, husbands, and widowers. When a predominant feature is relational, its relation to a second category tends to be asymmetric; thus a predominant feature of quivers is that they are for holding arrows. If arrows didn't exist, neither would quivers. But it is not a predominant feature of arrows that they can go in quivers, since arrows can exist on their own. Not all asymmetric relations take this form: parts tend to be related to their wholes, not vice versa. It is a predominant feature of arms that they are related to the whole body, but not vice versa. Note that a category may have more than one predominant feature, since it may be distinguished from different kinds of neighbors in different respects.
How, then, do concrete nouns work? Our assumption is that, in using a concrete noun, a speaker intends to denote objects by virtue of their membership in the category defined by the appropriate generic theory. In using brick, a speaker intends to denote the kind of object that fits his theory for bricks. For this to succeed, speakers and listeners must share roughly the same generic theory for bricks. The work on categories shows that this is a reasonable assumption-at least for the most prominent real-world categories, those named most simply within languages.
Under this view, concrete nouns are related in meaning to the extent that the theories conventionally associated with them are related. One way in which two theories are related is by predominant features. 'Ball' and 'brick' form one class of theories, because both have predominant features that specify size and shape. 'Widow' and 'orphan' form another, because both have predominant features that concern ontogeny. And 'tool' and 'vehicle' form a third class, because both have predominant features that specify potential roles. These classes, of course, can be further subdivided according to the kinds of physical characteristics, ontogeny, and potential roles that are referred to in the predominant features.
When the parent nouns of denominal verbs are classified in this way, we argue, they fall into classes and subclasses that correspond closely (if not exactly) with the classes and subclasses that we arrived at in our analysis of denominal verbs. Briefly, the parent nouns can be classified according to their predominant features roughly as follows:
(a) PLACEABLES. The parent nouns of locatum verbs denote placeables-things whose conventional role is to be placed with respect to other objects. A predominant feature of carpets, for example, is that they potentially go on floors. Note that carpets depend for their characterization on floors, not the reverse. So the right characterization of carpets is as placeables (carpets go on floors), not as places (floors go under carpets).
(b) PLACES. For location verbs, the parent nouns denote places-things with respect to which other objects are conventionally placed. Thus a predominant feature of kennels is that they are places where one ordinarily keeps dogs. Note that kennels rely for their characterization on dogs, whereas dogs can exist without kennels.
(c) TIME INTERVALS. The parent nouns of duration verbs denote time intervalstemporal 'places' in which events and processes can be located. Thus summers consist of June, July, and August, a specific time interval.
(d) AGENTS. The parent nouns of agent verbs denote agents, things whose predominant feature is that they do certain things. Butchers cut meat professionally; companions accompany people; and tailors make clothes professionally.
(e) RECEIVERS. The parent nouns of experiencer verbs denote things picked out for their role in receiving or experiencing things, e.g. witnesses.
(f) RESULTS. With goal verbs, ontogeny is important. Their parent nouns denote results, entities whose predominant feature is that they are end-products of some action or transformation. Thus widows form a category because they are a social product caused by the loss of their husbands. For many results, like braids, powder, and sandwiches, physical characteristics are also important: the endproduct is distinguished not just by the action or transformation carried out, but also by the physical characteristics that result.
(g) ANTECEDENTS. For source verbs, ontogeny is also important, but the parent nouns denote antecedents-the beginnings, not the final states-of some actions or transformations. A predominant feature of some types of pieces, for example, is that they are things out of which some products can be made.
(h) INSTRUMENTS. The things denoted by the parent nouns of instrument verbs are picked out for their potential roles as instruments. One of their predominant features is that they must be physically present for certain actions to take place, or for certain results to be accomplished. It is a predominant feature of ambulances that they are instruments for transporting the sick or wounded; a predominant feature of glue is that it is an instrument for attaching one object to another.
These eight categories, of course, do not exhaust the way predominant features can be classified. The miscellaneous denominal verbs have special predominant features; six of the eight categories are susceptible to a finer analysis; and some predominant features can be cross-classified-e.g., those of both places and placeables concern location. At this time, more detail would help very little.
The eight major types of predominant features can be represented, for convenience, as propositional functions. For example, a predominant feature of carpets is that they are located on floors: On(carpets, floors). More generally, placeables like carpets fit the broad locative proposition Loc(e,x) 'e is located with respect to x' (in which e denotes the entity in the category, and x denotes the class of things with respect to which it can be located). The propositional functions for these eight predominant features are listed in Table 1 4. CONSEQUENCES. According to the proposed convention, there are constraints on the kind of situation that an innovative denominal verb may denote. It has to be (a) the kind of situation (b) that the speaker has good reason to believe (c) that on this occasion the listener can readily compute (d) uniquely (e) on the basis of their mutual knowledge (f) in such a way that it encompasses the parent noun and the other surface arguments of the verb. These constraints tell us not only what a verb will be taken to mean on particular occasions, but also when and why it will be judged acceptable or unacceptable. These constraints interact, and so are difficult to examine separately. Instead, we will consider seven major consequences of their interaction. 4.1. MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE. The kind of situation that a verb denotes, according to condition (e) above, is intended to be computed on the basis of things mutually known or believed by the speaker and listener. Normally this constraint is easy to satisfy, since most of the needed facts belong to the core of generic knowledge; and these core facts are ordinarily assumed to be mutual knowledge. When two strangers meet, they normally assume that each knows-and that each knows that the other knows, etc.-almost everything in this core. So when they want to create a new verb interpretable to everyone, all they need do is make sure it is computable from the facts in this core. This is a property of most denominal verbs, both the well-established and the innovative.
How do listeners decide which kind of situation a verb picks out? Consider how they see that brick in brick the ice cream means 'form into the shape and size of a brick'. By conditions (a)-(d), the verb must denote 'the kind of situation which the speaker has good reason to believe that on this occasion the listener can readily compute uniquely'. The speaker would have just such a reason if the kind of situation denoted were a SALIENT, or CONSPICUOUSLY UNIQUE, part of core knowledge (see Lewis) . But the most salient part of one's generic knowledge of bricks is their predominant features-e.g., that they have a rectangular shape and child's-shoebox size. Because of this salience, the listener can readily infer that the speaker could well have intended brick to denote a kind of state, event, or process having to do with these predominant features. The choice of this kind of situation, of course, depends on the other constraints as well; but the salience of these predominant features is critical.
The denominal verbs that we classified earlier provide excellent evidence that the salience of predominant features is truly critical. Most of these verbs are well established. For them to have become well established, when they were created, they had to have been interpretable to nearly everyone. And for that to have happened, most of them had to have been computable from the core of generic knowledge-in particular, from the salient parts of this core. Most of these verbs, then, should reflect the predominant features of the entities denoted by their parent nouns; and they do. As we noted earlier, when these concrete entities are classified by their predominant features, they fall into such classes as placeables, places, and agents. These classes correspond almost exactly to such classes among the denominal verbs as locatum, location, and agent verbs. So the very classification provided earlier is evidence for the use of constraints (b)-(e).
Many generic theories of concrete objects, however, have more than one predominant feature; and so the corresponding well-established denominal verbs are often ambiguous. Shelves, for example, have at least two predominant features: they are places that things are put on, and placeables that are put on walls. This has allowed shelf to establish two meanings, those in shelve the books and shelve the closet. Other well-established verbs with at least two interpretations include floor the rooms/opponents; lime the walls/starlings; riddle the potatoes/the door with holes; brick the fireplace/cheese; curb the dog/street; cream the butter/coffee; tree the cat/avenue; and powder the nose/aspirin. Listeners resolve these ambiguities, as usual, by selecting the interpretation that they believe the speaker could reasonably expect them to pick out uniquely on that occasion. They can often do this merely by consulting the direct object of the verb: shelve the books means 'put the books on shelves' because it couldn't reasonably mean 'put shelves on the books'. Some concrete objects have predominant features that lead to a remarkable type of ambiguity. Two predominant features in the generic theory for 'milk', for example, are that milk is a substance put into or onto certain foods (its potential roles) and that it is a substance extracted from the mammary glands (its ontogeny). Consequently, milk has developed two meanings. In milk the tea it means 'put milk in'; in milk the cow it means 'take milk out'. This type of ambiguity is remarkable because the second interpretation is contradictory to the first-which in List 1 we labeled 'in' and 'not-in'. Other verbs that have developed contradictory senses include seed the lawn/grapes; scale his hand/fish; cork the bottle/oaks; wind the organ/ man; fleece the stones with moss/the sheep; top the cake/tree; shell the roadbed/ peanuts; fin the boat/fish; girdle the waist/tree; The tree barked over/Bark the tree; and dust the shelf.
It is easy to see how such contradictory interpretations can arise. Negative locatum verbs generally have parent nouns that denote parts of whole objects. Rinds, fleeces, and cores are proper parts of lemons, sheep, and apples (see Brown). Normally, these parts can be moved in only one direction with respect to their wholes-out or off-and so rind the lemon, fleece the sheep, and core the apple are all interpreted negatively. Yet the objects denoted by some of these parent nouns are conventionally placed in or on something else-as milk goes into tea or onto cereal-and this leads to the positive, the contradictory, interpretations in milk the tea and milk the cereal. The contradictory interpretations appear able to develop because they arise in contexts where they would not be confused.7
However Mutual knowledge is also critical for the interpretation of verbs as distributive or collective. By virtue of generic knowledge, stamp the envelopes would normally be construed to mean that there was one or more stamps per envelope (a distributive interpretation), not that there was one or more stamps for the envelopes taken as a set (a collective interpretation). Blanket the children, however, could be taken either way; e.g., unlike stamp, it could be collective, with one or more blankets for the children as a set, if there were two children in one bed. Mutual knowledge of the particulars in each context is normally required to decide the issue. This issue, however, tends to have a uniform resolution for location verbs with 7 Because of the existence of denominal adjectives, as in three-towered castle, negative denominal verbs like these can lead to unfortunate ambiguities when used as past participles. Pitted dates can be either dates with pits (the denominal-adjective reading), or dates that have had their pits removed (the denominal-verb reading). This ambiguity is compounded, since both forms can be negated with the prefix un-: unpitted dates can also be dates with or without pits. mass or collective parent nouns. Note that shellac the wall requires shellac to COVER the wall: a dab of shellac on the wall won't do. Given the uniqueness condition (d), this makes good sense. The speaker must have good grounds for believing that the kind of situation denoted by shellac can be computed uniquely. But how much of the wall is covered by shellac? The only unique but reasonable answer is 'as completely as would be expected under the circumstances'. Connie powdered her nose, therefore, implies that the powder covered all those parts of Connie's nose that the listener would expect to be covered. Its precise interpretation depends on the speaker's and listener's assessment of their mutual knowledge about nose powdering, Connie, and her habits. And carpet thefloor, carpet the room, and carpet the house would ordinarily all be construed to mean that the carpet went only on the floors-consistent with our generic theory for carpets-and, for carpet the house, only on those floors that are normally expected to be covered (which excludes the kitchen, the cellar, and the garage). Yet carpet the wall would not be construed to mean that the carpets went on the floor, since wall contrasts with floor, and rules out just such an interpretation.
The point of the examples in this section is that mutual knowledge is essential to the interpretation of innovative denominal verbs. To select the unique sense intended on a particular occasion, the listener must decide which of the possible senses is most salient. Generally he can look to the predominant features of the generic theory associated with the parent noun, which will always be fairly salient. But salience is a relative notion, and depends on context. The listener must always assess his and the speaker's mutual knowledge of the particulars in the present context, since that may make some other sense the most salient. The listener's ultimate goal is to find that sense which 'the speaker has good reason to believe that on this occasion the listener can readily compute uniquely.' 4.2. KINDS OF SITUATIONS. According to condition (a), an innovative denominal verb is intended to denote a KIND of situation. What is meant by 'kind'? That is a difficult epistemological question that we would not presume to answer here; but to get off the ground, let us begin with an intuitive characterization. A kind is a class or category of things with a rationale for membership, based on human conceptual and perceptual principles. So a kind is not a category of arbitrarily chosen things, like the class consisting of male humans and pine needles, but a category with a rationale that makes sense, like the class consisting of male humans and female humans.
Rationales for kinds come in many different forms. One we have already mentioned is the optimization of cue validity: things in the world tend to be categorized into kinds such that things within each category are as similar as possible to each other, and as different as possible from things in other categories. It is on this basis that fruits divide into such kinds as apples, oranges, and bananas; that furniture divides into such kinds as tables, chairs, and bookcases; and so on (Rosch & Mervis, Rosch et at., Tversky). Things can also be categorized into kinds on the basis of just one or a few distinguishing properties; thus dogs, cats, turtles, and goldfish constitute a kind because they are domesticable.
Some rationales for kinds, however, are apparently valued more highly than others; and the kinds they define are therefore deemed 'better' than others. For example, rationales based on permanent, inherent properties seem more highly valued than those based on temporary, non-inherent ones. 'Round-things' make a better kind than do 'things likely to be found in a garage'. And rationales based on prominent properties seem to be more highly valued than those based on nonprominent ones. 'Foods that taste sweet' make a better kind than 'foods that are rich in calcium'. In effect, kinds lie on a continuum from those with highly valued and obvious rationales to those that are so arbitrary that any rationale they can be given will seem ad-hoc. When it comes to situations, kinds are particularly difficult to characterize, because situations are themselves difficult to characterize. Unlike concrete objects, situations do not come ready-made in discrete bundles. An act of sauteing, for instance, has no clear beginning or end; it may or may not include fetching the butter, turning on the heat, and scrubbing the pan afterward. Like other situations, it has vague boundaries. Situations are also vague in their range. Cooking may include sauteing, frying, and broiling; but what about roasting marshmallows, making popcorn, and defrosting orange juice? Vagueness in boundaries and range is typical of most kinds of situations.
Yet situations clearly fall into kinds when they have good rationales. One common rationale is that a kind of situation consists of all situations that have the same goal, purpose, or outcome. Thus sauteing consists of activities whose goal is the irreversible change in food to make it suitable for eating. Another common rationale is that a kind consists of all situations that employ the same means toward some end. Sauteing, to continue the example, consists of activities whose means requires the application of heat in a pan with hot fat (Lehrer 1969 ). For sauteing, in fact, both the goal and the means seem to be critical. It is easy to see how, with these rationales, sauteing would have both vague boundaries and a vague range. But these examples give only a flavor of possible rationales for kinds of situations. A full account of innovative denominal verbs will require a proper epistemological theory of situations and how they fall into kinds.
Kinds are critical to the interpretation of innovative denominal verbs. For any such verb, there may always be a unique class of situations that the verb could denote in that context; but uniqueness isn't enough. Unless this class constitutes a kind with a highly-valued rationale, the verb will be judged relatively unacceptable in context. In He Houdini'd something, for example, Houdini could denote the unique class of things that we know Houdini did-escape from locked boxes, dote on his mother, and unmask fraudulent mediums. But this class is too diverse to have a highly-valued rationale, and so in this instance the verb is not very acceptable. But change the sentence to He Houdini'd the locks open or He Houdini'd his mother or He Houdini'd the fake palm reader, and suddenly it becomes more acceptable. Now the unique class that one can arrive at has a highly-valued rationale, since any one of these activities-picking a lock, doting on one's mother, or unmasking frauds-is a kind with a common means, a common end, or both. As another example, She wanted to Richard Nixon her friend allows us to arrive at a unique class of situations-the class of things Richard Nixon did that one person could do to another. This diverse class, however, does not have a rationale that is highly-valued; hence Richard Nixon as a verb is not very acceptable. Yet change the sentence to She wanted to Richard Nixon a tape of the damaging conversation she had had with her friend, and it suddenly becomes more acceptable. Now the class of situations has a common means and a common end-erasure to get rid of incriminating evidence--and that makes it a better kind.
SPECIFICITY. Another consequence of the convention on innovations is captured thus:
(26) PRINCIPLE OF SPECIFICITY: The kind of situation that an innovation denotes is intended to be as specific as the circumstances warrant. On hearing Margaret jetted to London, for example, we are warranted in inferring that she traveled by jet, but not that she travelled by just any type of airplane (which is not as specific as the circumstances warrant), or that she traveled by 747 (which is more specific than the circumstances warrant). The rationale for this principle is straightforward. According to condition (f), the kind of situation denoted by jetted must be one in which jets, Margaret, and London play roles. For this kind of situation to be unique-condition (d)-the means of transportation could not be anything more general than jets. We would have no way of deciding uniquely among the possibilities: any type of fast airplane, any type of airplane, any type of flying machine, or any type of vehicle. Nor could we infer a means of transportation that is more specific (like a 747, 707, or Concorde), because we could still not do so uniquely. It must be just right-as specific as the circumstances warrant.
With many denominal verbs, the more specific the circumstances, the more interpretable the verb becomes. In He Houdini'd something, the context warrants a kind of situation that is so general and diverse that it doesn't have a very highly- 'go by horse-drawn vehicle', and therefore contrasted with motor and auto. With the passing of horse-drawn vehicles, drive has come to mean 'go by car', and now pre-empts the verb car, whose parent noun is the ordinary name for this vehicle. The verbs motor and auto, based on uncommon names for car, have been retainedbut with a quaint, dated flavor for a specialized register that makes each of them contrast in meaning with drive.'0 Suppletion can also be exemplified among the terms for body parts. Thus elbow, hip, shoulder,finger, eye, chin, and other body-part names occur as denominal verbs; but fist the man in the face, palm his face, foot him in the knee, lip someone on the cheeks, and fingernail his back do not-at least in the senses of'hit', 'slap', 'kick', 'kiss', and 'scratch'. The reason, we suggest, is that they are pre-empted by these well-established verbs with which they would be precisely synonymous. Of course, the expressions withfist, palm, foot, lip, and fingernail can be used innovatively; but then they are taken to mean something different. Thusfist the man in the face could mean 'grind a fist into the face of the man', and palm his face could mean 'brush his face with one's palm'; but they could not mean simply 'hit' or 'slap'. On the other side of the coin, the verbs eye and eyeball, which at first seem to be synonymous with look, actually belong to the large semantic field of looking terms-look, watch, observe, view, ogle, survey, regard, gawk at, stare at etc.-and form subtle contrasts with each of them. Indeed, although foot the ball through the uprights is sometimes used by sportswriters to mean something like 'kick', it is always intended to contrast with kick in some way or another-in register or humor. So suppletion appears to account for the unacceptability of certain denominal verbs, and for the contrast in meaning in others. 4.42. ENTRENCHMENT. In pre-emption by entrenchment, the presence of one idiomatic denominal verb prevents the formation from the same parent noun of a second denominal verb with the same meaning (cf. Rose). Hospitalize, built on the noun hospital, is so entrenched that it pre-empts the creation of the second verb hospital with the same meaning. There are many such cases in English. Prison the thief, parallel to jail the thief, is pre-empted by the well-entrenched imprison the thief; tomb is pre-empted by entomb, pollen by pollenate, and throne by enthrone. When there are two denominal verbs formed from the same parent noun, they contrast in meaning, e.g. winter vs. winterize and list vs. enlist. In other words, if their meanings would be identical, the entrenched verb always takes precedence over and pre-empts the newcomer. synonymous. To butcher is acceptable because it has no such ancestor. Pre-emption by ancestry also seems to account for the unacceptability of to farmer the hillside, to banker the money, and to driver the car, which are otherwise similar to to umpire the game, to volunteer the information, and to chauffeur the car. As before, however, a denominal verb can be acceptable if it contrasts in meaning with its grandparent. Sweeper the floor is acceptable, despite the presence of sweep, because sweeper entails the use of a carpet-sweeper, while sweep does not. An obvious ancestor, therefore, will pre-empt its descendant denominal verb if its descendant would have the identical meaning.
These three types of pre-emption-suppletion, entrenchment, and ancestryprevent true synonyms. The obvious verb senses of car, hospital, and baker are prevented outright by drive, hospitalize, and bake; while the senses of palm, list, and sweeper are forced to be distinct from those of slap, enlist, and sweep. As Bolinger 1977 and others have argued, language in general eschews complete synonyms. This tendency may reflect the general applicability of conditions (b)-(d). When an expression has a true synonym, the speaker must have a good reason for selecting it over its alternative; and the listener, to satisfy unique computability, will try to find one. This does two things. It prevents the speaker from creating new expressions that are completely synonymous with old ones; and it forces him to add distinctions whenever he uses one of two expressions that would otherwise be completely synonymous. Both forces tend to prevent the creation of true synonyms.
A fourth type of pre-emption works by homonymy instead of synonymy, as stated in this principle:
(28) PRINCIPLE OF PRE-EMPTION BY HOMONYMY: If a potential innovative denominal verb is homonymous with a well-established verb and could be confused with it, the innovative verb is normally pre-empted, and therefore is considered unacceptable. So Jan Dodged to New York, meaning 'Jan went to New York by a Dodge', is normally unacceptable, because it would be confused with the common verb meaning 'shift suddenly'. The same goes for Jan Forded to New York, though the parallel construction Jan Chevied to New York is quite all right in the appropriate contrastive context. To take another semantic domain: to summer, autumn, and winter in France is acceptable, but to spring andfall in France is not, being pre-empted by the homonymous common verbs spring and fall. When marked for past tense, as in She springed andfalled in France, they get even worse: the speaker now sounds as if he had also added the wrong inflections. Homonymy, then, is still another source of pre-emption. 4.5. READY COMPUTABILITY. Condition (c) on its own requires that the sense of a denominal verb be one that the listener can compute readily. The idea is that, although some denominal verbs may be comprehensible on every other count, they may not be READILY computable in this context by this particular listener. As an analogy, imagine that Helen told Sam, I asked Linda and Winifred over tonight, but THE OLDER one couldn't make it. If Linda and Winifred were of similar age, and Helen knew that Sam couldn't figure out which was older without considerable thought, she shouldn't have referred to Winifred as the older one. Its referent, although computable, cannot be computed readily. She could have used the latter instead, since its referent Is computed readily from information easily accessible in what she said. The relative acceptability of the older one and the latter, then, depends not merely on computability, but on READY computability. These examples have their parallels in innovative denominal verbs.
In order for the sense of an innovation to be computed readily, the listener must ordinarily be able to bring to mind very quickly the information necessary for its computation. Many people, for example, would find It's stratusing right now, uttered by the first person they met in the morning, to be unacceptable-even though, with some thought, they could figure out what it meant. But said by a television weather reporter, in a discussion about cloud formation (as it actually was), it is quite acceptable. In that context, the listener finds it easy to recall that stratus is a type of cloud, and to see that the speaker must be talking about cloud formation. Similarly, My telephone was Hoovered once would be unacceptable in many contexts, since it would be difficult to discover the eponym J. Edgar Hoover and to sift through all we know about his activities to arrive at wiretapping. But in a conversation about FBI wiretapping, an utterance of the same sentence is fully acceptable. Accessible information seems to be crucial to ready computability.
Accessibility of information can also make a difference to what a verb is taken to mean, since one criterion for the salience of a particular kind of situation is its accessibility in memory. Thus, in Roger speared a cake of soap, spear would ordinarily be taken in one of its conventional senses, 'pierce as with a spear'. But in a conversation on how Roger had managed to carve soap into different shapes for a display on hunting, it would be taken as an innovative denominal verb meaning 'form into the shape of a spear'. In this context, the conventional meaning of spear is pre-empted, not merely because Roger's carving activities are mutually known by the speaker and listener, but also because that knowledge is readily accessible. The speaker can be confident the listener will see this information to be relevant, simply because it is so accessible in this context. So the constraint on ready computability is an important part of the innovative denominal verb Thus children may have all the prerequisite knowledge for understanding a particular innovation, but lack the ability to do the computation. In speaking to children, we make these judgments, and avoid innovations that surpass their ability. We do much the same thing in talking to foreigners, drunks, and other people we judge to be temporarily or permanently less able. to outsiders. New technologies seem to be responsible for many of the denominal verbs that are now very common-Xerox, telephone, wire, radio, and paperclip. In each case, a complicated situation is expressed economically in a single verb.
Economy of expression apparently has its rewards. First, there is precision. For the hospital worker, autoclave the scalpels is more precise than sterilize the scalpels, and yet takes no longer to say. Second, there is vividness. For a political writer, it is more effective to say The mayor tried to Richard Nixon the tapes of the meeting than to use erase in place of Nixon. The allusion to Nixon calls forth an image of an unscrupulous politician trying desperately to cover his tracks-an image that even a longer description could never capture adequately. There seems to be an intrinsic value to making allusions without belaboring them. Third, there is surprise. Jokes, witticisms, and other rhetorical devices depend for their effect on surprise, which in turn depends on economy of expression. This effect is exploited daily by such newspaper columnists as Herb Caen: The SFProgress is not a biweekly, as ERRA TUM'd here yesterday, but a semi-weekly, and Chevy [Chase] especially has been CHOP-STICKING all over the place, starting with Kan's.
When economy of expression is taken too far, it loses its ready computability, and the result is inelegant. Some verbs seem inelegant because they are cumbersome, as in We Fourth-of-July'd at Lake Tahoe. This inelegance, however, is sometimes used deliberately, for comic effect, as in Punch's He extract-of-beefed his bread. Other verbs require so much extra work in computing that the effort doesn't seem worth it. While the attested example Karen weekended in the country seems good enough, Karen Saturdayed in the country does not. It appears that the effort demanded for computing Saturdayed outweighs any economy of expression, although this too may be an asset for comic effects.
There are also some clear cases of morphological confusion, where an innovation is unacceptable because its parent noun is already inflected for tense or number. This sketch of syntactic constraints brings out two points. First, the interpretation of an innovative verb is strongly constrained by its syntactic environment. This is hardly surprising. But second, these constraints do not work in a vacuum. To distinguish the interpretations of siren midday and siren the Porsche to a stop, one must know the difference between factory and police sirens, and how they are used. To interpret Ed's teapot the policeman, one must know even more. So syntactic constraints must be considered along with all the other conditions placed on interpretations-conditions (a)-(e). No single constraint will suffice. (b) NEAR-INNOVATIONS. When a speaker or group of speakers uses an innovation more than once, and it is recognized as the same form, then we have a nearinnovation. Thus Herb Caen has used houseguest and chopstick more than once, and readers have begun to recognize these as 'his' words. Once again, these may or may not proceed to the next stage.
(c) HALF-ASSIMILATED TRANSPARENT IDIOMS. Some verbs become transparent idioms for one group of speakers, but remain innovations for everyone else. Key in the data, for example, appears to be idiomatic among computerniks, as noted earlier, but it is still perceived as an innovation by the rest of us. Satellite the broadcast was probably idiomatic within CBS before it was used on television, where it was perceived by most viewers as innovative. For verbs at this stage to move on to the next, they must generally be transparent to the outgroup, as both key in and satellite are. 'bring down') . Land, for instance, was originally used in navigation to mean 'disembark'. Earlier in this century, it was transferred (along with many other navigational terms) to aeronautics-for airplanes putting down on land from the air. When airplanes were designed to put down on water, the idiomatization was apparently so complete that it didn't seem odd to 'land' on water. Not all denominal verbs will pass through the stages in this order, or even complete the series. A verb like key in could lose its transparency within the computer community even before it is assimilated into English; and verbs like ground and eye will probably never become opaque. The majority of denominal verbs, it seems, have become assimilated just because they are virtually transparent. This makes them readily understood by people who have never heard them before, especially children, and they are therefore readily maintained with a stable meaning. Yet when there is a lexical gap that could usefully be filled, opaque verbs like lynch, boycott, and pander are also readily maintained-but as verbs unconnected to nouns.
Because one of the main functions of idiomatization is the creation of specialpurpose verbs, dictionaries are strewn with partly specialized idioms. The verbs formed from shell, as listed in the OED, are quite typical:' remove (a seed) from its shell', 'expel (a growth)', 'shed (milkteeth)', 'drop out of a shell', 'remove the shell of', 'bring forth as from a shell', 'scale off', 'enclose in a shell', 'furnish with shells for collecting oyster spawn', 'spread shells on', 'bombard with shells', and 'drive out by shelling'. Many of these senses are utterly unfamiliar to modern ears, as we would expect. Such specialized senses should be abandoned when the object is no longer is use, as in to archie or to roneo (Partridge); when the object no longer has the particular use, as in Zeppelin the fleet, used in World War I to mean 'bomb the fleet from Zeppelins' (Jespersen); or when the special allusion is no longer recognizable, as in Copenhagen the fleet 'sink without warning', or Burgoyne a general 'capture' (Partridge). Dictionaries probably underestimate the number of specialized uses that have arisen by this process. to treat many adult idioms as if they were innovations, and many adult innovations as if they were idioms. These two 'errors' have important consequences.
Children produce innovations from a very early age, and some of these conform to the adult constraints on innovations. Thus one child, C, said I'm crackering my soup as she dropped crackers in her soup (age 3;11); another child, D.H., said Mummy trousers me in talking about getting dressed (age 2;3); still another, S, said I broomed her after hitting his baby sister with a toy broom (age 2;7). But the innovative denominal-verb convention takes time to learn, and many early innovations fall short of the adult constraints-some wildly-even though most are interpretable in context. So C, fantasizing about a trip, said We're all going to Because of this early facility, children may produce and understand particular denominal verbs very differently from adults. Consider these four possibilities. First, they may learn the noun hammer, and then create and use the verb hammer, even though it is idiomatic for adults. Here their innovation corresponds to the adult's transparent idiom. Second, they may hear the verb truck, and from their prior knowledge of the noun truck interpret it as an innovative denominal verb. Again, their innovation corresponds to the adult's transparent idiom. Third, they may learn the noun dial as applied to clocks, bathroom scales, and gas meters, and separately learn the verb dial the number for push-button (and dialless) telephones, never realizing that the two are related. 12 In this case their opaque idiom corresponds to the adult's partly specialized idiom. Fourth, they may hear a near-innovation like Let's chopstick for dinner again-in the absence of chopsticks-and interpret it as an idiom meaning 'have Chinese food'. In this instance, their opaque idiom corresponds to the adult's near-innovation. There are other possibilities, too, including those in which the child and adult agree in their treatments. The point is that, as children create their own system of language, they may alter the status of verbs as innovations or idioms.
Children, then, may play a role both in keeping language stable and in speeding language change. They probably contribute to language stability when they treat adult idioms as innovations. For example, in producing or understanding bicycle, truck, and jeep as innovations, they may prevent those verbs from deviating too far from the paradigm 'go by [vehicle]', from becoming partly specialized idioms like land, ground, and smoke. On the other hand, children probably spur on language change when they treat near-innovations and partly specialized idioms as opaque. Thus, treating the noun and verb dial as unrelated, they may contribute to the acceptance of dial as an opaque idiom; in treating chopstick as an opaque idiom, they may effectively be introducing it into English as just such an idiom. Here as elsewhere, children are probably instrumental in both maintaining and changing language.
5.3. LANGUAGE PROCESSING. In speaking and listening, people must certainly process innovations and idioms very differently. Consider comprehension. For innovations, at one extreme, people must create completely new meanings: confronted with Wayned, they cannot retrieve a ready-made meaning from their mental lexicon, since they have none for verbs they have never heard before. If the line we have taken is correct, they must construct the meaning of Wayned in conformity with the innovative denominal-verb convention. For idioms, at the other extreme, listeners must retrieve ready-made senses: they must look for boycott as a verb in their mental lexicon, since they don't have the parent noun Boycott available. Parallel arguments hold for innovations and idioms in production.
Between the two extremes, it isn't always clear what should happen. Transparent idioms, for example, could be processed either as innovations or as opaque idioms; both processes would lead to the right interpretation. But these verbs are so frequent, and so well assimilated as verbs, that they are presumably processed most of the time like opaque idioms. In comprehension, it would be inefficient for their meanings to be recreated each time when they could be retrieved from the lexicon ready-made-like most other word meanings. Indeed, this almost has to be true if we are to account for pre-emption. When a verb has a common idiomatic sense, that normally takes precedence over certain innovative senses. Thus, although on reflection the noun bottle may be recognized in bottle the beer, this information isn't normally used in the process of saying or interpreting it.
Yet, in the right circumstances, transparent idioms may be processed as innovations. Imagine hearing We used everything-we snowmobiled, snowshoed, and skated, as opposed to We did everything-we hiked, drank beer, and skated. The first sentence contrasts the three instruments, and invites skated to be processed as an innovation on a par with snowmobiled and snowshoed. But the second contrasts three activities, and invites skated to be treated as an opaque idiom on a par with hiked and drank. With contrastive stress, the noun origins of a verb are readily brought to the fore. In We didn't use our CAR-we TAXIED to the airport, the instruments are contrasted, a car vs. a taxi, while the rest of the meaning of taxied, 'went by X', is backgrounded (Watt) . How transparent idioms like skate and taxi are processed, therefore, may depend on the context. This may also be true of partly specialized idioms.
The presence of innovations, near-innovations, and idioms sometimes processed as innovations offers a distinct challenge to most theories of comprehension and production. These theories implicitly assume that all word meanings are available ready-made in the mental lexicon. That assumption is clearly wrong. If innovations of all types are as common and as readily understood as we suppose, then no theory of comprehension or production can be complete unless it handles them in the natural course of the relevant processes. Right now this goal seems far off. 5.4. SYNCHRONIC DESCRIPTION. Contemporary English has denominal verbs at each stage of idiomatization-from full innovations, like bargain-counter, to opaque idioms like boycott. How much of this information belongs in the synchronic description of English? If such a description is supposed to characterize the ideal speaker/listener's 'knowledge' of English, we have a problem-because, as applied to denominal verbs, 'knowledge' has at least four interpretations. First, it could mean 'always-used information': in comprehending bargain-counter, listeners probably always use the fact that it comes from the noun. Second, it could mean 'usable information': for taxi, listeners may not normally use the fact it comes from a noun, but in contrastive contexts they can. Third, it could mean merely 'awareness on reflection': many people are surprised when they are shown that the noun and verb land are related-but, on reflection, they could probably figure this out for themselves. Fourth, it could mean simply 'intellectualizable information': most people could not figure out for themselves the relation between boycott and Captain Boycott; but when informed by a dictionary or a specialist, they would in some sense 'know' the denominal character of boycott. These successively more inclusive criteria for 'knowledge', of course, lead to different synchronic descriptions of denominal verbs.
Forced to make a choice, we would probably opt for a synchronic description that included only 'usable information', knowledge that is or can be accessed in normal language use. But it may be more defensible to include all information about denominal verbs, yet distinguish which parts are known at which level of knowledge. The synchronic description, in any event, will have to do more than just dichotomize denominal verbs into innovations and idioms.
There is a further complication: note that idioms and innovations can co-exist with the same parent noun. The idioms shelve the books and shelve the closet coexist with innovative uses of shelve, as in While maneuvering through the door, the carpenter shelved his assistant in the back ('poked with a shelf'). The complication is that these idioms often shade off into innovations, with no clear boundary. In Alex forked the peas into his mouth, for example, fork has an idiomatic sense 'convey in the normal manner by means of a fork'. We all know, of course, what the normal manner is-which, if this sense is to be idiomatic, must be defined independently of any context. But if it is mutual knowledge that Alex is a child who uses a fork two-fisted, or backwards, or only as a means to catapult food into his mouth, the speaker would intend fork to mean 'convey by a fork in a two-fisted manner', or 'convey by a backward fork', or 'catapult by means of a fork'. At what point has Alex strayed too far from the 'normal manner' ? At what point have we moved from the idiomatic sense offork to an innovative one ? There is no obvious answer, and this adds still another complication to the synchronic description of denominal verbs.13 6. CONCLUSION. We have argued that, although denominal verbs belong to a unified morphological family (they are all parented by nouns), they do not allow a unified semantic description. Innovations like Wayne and houseguest must be dealt with differently from opaque idioms like lynch and badger, and differently even from transparent but well-established verbs like bicycle and smoke. As for the innovations, we have argued, they are not derived from nouns in the usual sense of semantic derivation. What they mean depends on the time, place, and circumstances in which they are uttered, and must be accounted for by a convention about their use. This convention makes essential use of such notions as kinds of situations, rationality, ready computability, uniqueness, the speaker's and listener's mutual knowledge, and certain syntactic constraints.
Innovations, however, are found not only among denominal verbs, but pervade virtually every other construction in the language. Forming and understanding them is therefore an intrinsic part of our capacity to use language, and should be accounted for by any theory of language that claims to be complete. So far, however, most attention has been paid to innovations that are NOT contextual. Yet, if we are right, many innovations are contextual, including (besides denominal verbs) compound nouns, possessive constructions, 'eponymous' verbs, commonized proper nouns, and shorthand expressions. There are probably many more types. If these are truly contextual expressions, they will require an account very much like the one we have given here for denominal verbs. As we have suggested, conditions (a)-(e) of our convention may be common to all such contextual expressions-with condition (f), which refers to syntactic constraints, changing from construction to construction. All this, in turn, is part of a broader attempt to specify what speakers mean in uttering sentences on particular occasions. This is an enterprise that has been neglected for too long.
